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COMMENTS 
WILLS-REVOCATION BY AcT TO THE DOCUMENT-EFFECT ON 
Comc1L-The term codicil generally refers to a supplement to a 
will by which the testator alters or adds to his will.1 It may be 
nominated a codicil by the testator or held to be one by judicial 
construction. If it is to be operative at all, a codicil must of course 
be executed with all the formalities required by the statute of 
wills. But, just as it is difficult to describe a codicil without refer-
ence to a primary testamentary document, so also is it difficult 
to determine the status of an otherwise valid codicil when the 
will it supplements has been revoked. When the will has been 
revoked, either by an express act of the testator or by operation 
of law,2 how should a court treat a codicil which itself has not 
been mutilated with intent to revoke and not mentioned ex-
pressly by a subsequent revoking instrument? 
It should be recognized at the outset that this question may 
be raised in either of two settings. First, should such an instrument 
be admitted to probate? Second, if admitted, what effect should 
be given to it? It is with the first of these two possibilities that 
this discussion is primarily concerned, for it is at the probate 
stage that the determination as to revocation must be made, and 
a probate court finding that the codicil has been revoked obviates 
the necessity for any inquiry into the meaning of its language. 
I. THE ENGLISH CASES BEFORE THE STATUTE OF WILLS 
Prior to the enactment of the English Statute of Wills,3 a 
presumption existed that the revocation of a will revoked its 
codicils.4 This presumption was rebuttable, however, by showing 
that the testator had a contrary intent. 
The earliest case to consider the question was Barrow v. Bar-
row, 5 decided in 1756. Although the opinion states that by the 
law of England the codicil was not revoked when the will was 
destroyed, in order to sustain the admission of the codicil to pro-
1 JARMAN, 'WILLS 25 (8th ed. 1951). 
2 As to what events will work a revocation by operation of law, see ATKINSON, 
'WILLS § 85 (2d ed. 1953) • 
a 7 Will. 4 &: 1 Viet., c. 26 § 20. 
4 Tagart v. Hooper, 1 Curt. 289, 163 Eng. Rep. 98 (Prer. Ct. 1836) ; Coppin v. 
Dillon, 4 Hagg. Ecc. 361, 162 Eng. Rep. 1478 (Prer. Ct. 1833) ; Medlycott v. Assheton, 
2 Add. 229, 162 Eng. Rep. 278 (Prer. Ct. 1824) ; Barrow v. Barrow, 2 Lee 335, 161 Eng. 
Rep. 360 (Prer. Ct. 1756). 
5 2 Lee 335, 161 Eng. Rep. 360 (Prer. Ct. 1756). 
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bate heavy reliance was placed on the testator's intent to die 
testate and on statements made by him after the burning of the 
will that he intended his wife to get the property as the codicil 
indicated. In Medlycott v. Assheton,6 decided in 1824, the court 
clearly states the principle that a codicil is prima fade dependent 
on the will and that cancellation of the will is an implied revoca-
tion of the codicil. Here the requisite intent to rebut the presump-
tion was held to be lacking when the court found the codicil, in 
which a bequest was made to trustees named in the cancelled 
will, to be intimately connected with the destroyed will. The fact 
that the cancelled will was the only means of ascertaining the 
legatees under the codicil was for this court determinative of 
the testator's intent.7 The only other case to arise prior to the 
Statute of Wills was that of Tagart v. Hooper.8 Here the in-
strument by its terms was declared to be a codicil to the will and 
to be taken as part thereof. The will itself was not found after 
the testator's death and the presumption of its destruction by 
him with intent to revoke was raised. By its terms the codicil 
made a bequest to trustees9 to pay income to A for life, remainder 
over to B. The court adopted the view that the codicil was in-
tended by the testator to be an additional bequest, quite inde-
pendent of anything he provided for in his will, and that since 
the codicil was not contingent on the will for meaning in any 
way the presumption of revocation of the codicil by revocation 
of the will was overcome. 
Thus, it appears that the common law courts were willing to 
accept and make determinative any available direct evidence of 
the testator's intent that the codicil should stand although the 
will was revoked. Where direct expression of such intent was 
lacking it could be implied if the codicil presented a clearly in-
dependent disposition. 
II. THE EFFECT OF THE STATUTE OF WILLS 
With the enactment of the Statute of Wills10 in 1837 the ques-
tion should have become one of statutory interpretation. The 
6 2 Add. 229, 162 Eng. Rep. 278 (Prer. Ct. 1824) • 
1 Coppin v. Dillon, 4 Hagg. Ecc. 361, 162 Eng. Rep. 1478 (Prer. Ct. 1833), in 
which the codicil was denied probate, was decided on identical grounds. 
8 1 Curt. 289, 163 Eng. Rep. 98 (Prer. Ct. 1836) • 
9 The report of the case does not indicate whether the trustees were specifically 
named in the codicil. 
10 7 Will. 4 &: 1 Viet., c. 26. 
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statute, on its face, purports to declare that no will or codicil 
can be revoked except by certain specified acts to "the same," 
or by a subsequent instrument. Although it would seem, there-
fore, that the principal inquiry for the courts should be whether 
the statutory demands have been met, this was not the immediate 
effect. Two cases, Goods of Halliwell11 and Clogstoun v. Wal-
cott,12 decided by the same judge13 only a year apart, demonstrate 
the confusion which existed. Goods of Halliwell (1846) presented 
a codicil which made no bequests or appointments but related 
solely to settlement of accounts between testator and his business 
partner. The court still spoke in terms of a presumption that 
the codicil will fall with the will. In this instance it was admitted 
to probate when the court found that the codicil was made for a 
special purpose, that it was totally independent of the general 
disposition of property, and that therefore it did not appear that 
testator could have meant to destroy the codicil with the will.14 
No mention was made in the opinion of the wills statute en-
acted nine years earlier. In Clogstoun v. Walcott (1847) the 
testator, after destroying his will by burning it, expressed orally 
his intention that two codicils which still existed should be ef-
fective. The court recognized that the wills statute must be 
considered, and held that the presumption of revocation which 
existed prior to the act no longer applied and that the codicils 
should be admitted to probate unless the testator's intent to 
revoke them is shown.15 However, the court went far to defeat 
the operation of the statute by saying that the revocation of the 
will is prima fade evidence of testator's intent to revoke the 
codicil. Thus the burden is placed again on the party offering 
the codicil. Here the codicils were admitted when the court 
allowed oral testimony of testator's intent in order to rebut the 
prima fade evidence of revocation. 
In an apparent return to the pre-statute presumption, the 
court in Grimwood v. Cozens16 declared that the revocation of 
11 4 N.C. 400 (Prer. Ct. 1846). 
12 5 N.C. 623 (Prer. Ct. 1847). 
13 Sir H. Jenner Fust. 
14 See Goods of Coulthard, 11 Jur. N.S. Pt. 1, 184 (P. Ct. 1865) which cites this 
case, Tagart v. Hooper, 1 Curt. 289, 163 Eng. Rep. 98 (Prer. Ct. 1836) and Barrow v. 
Barrow, 2 Lee 335, 161 Eng. Rep. 360 (Prer. Ct. 1756) as authority for summarily 
admitting the codicil to probate; Goods of Clements, [1892] P. 254 admits a codicil to 
probate, citing Goods of Coulthard, supra, as authority. 
15 The opinion does not indicate any theory for this reversal. 
16 2 Swab. &: T. 364, 5 Jur. N.S. Pt. 1, 497 (P. Ct. 1859). 
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a will revoked its codicils unless the testator's contrary intent 
was found. On the basis of written but non-testamentary docu-
ments, in which the testator declared his intent that the codicils 
should fail, the court held that the codicils were revoked. 
A new point of departure17 was developed in 1864 in Goods 
of Ellice, 18 where the decision to admit the codicil to probate was 
based on the substantially independent character of the instru-
ment. Although it is possible to view this decision as indicating 
merely another method of determining intent of the testator, the 
court appears more concerned with the language of the instrument 
itself and its ability to stand apart from the will and still make 
some sense as a testamentary disposition. Although the result in 
this case is the same as that which would have been reached on 
the basis of the pre-statute Medlycott and Tagart cases, the dif-
ference in theory is significant. Here, the .independence of the 
instrument becomes the ultimate fact while in the earlier two 
cases it is but evidentiary, to be weighed along with other available 
evidence tending to show the testator's intent. Thus, under the 
theory of the Medlycott and Tagart cases, an instrument, inde-
pendent on its face, would be denied probate if other evidence 
established the testator's intent that it should fall. Such a result 
is not possible under the theory of Goods of Ellice. 
From the discussion of the four immediately preceding cases 
it is clear that regardless of which presumption the courts pur-
ported to follow with regard to revocation of the codicil, the 
primary inquiry was into the testator's intent rather than com-
pliance with the wills statute. By following this course the courts 
arguably have failed to appreciate the significance of the legisla-
tive act. It is fundamental to the statute that, regardless of tes-
tator's intent, an instrument not properly executed could not make 
a testamentary disposition of property. Similarly, regardless of 
testator's intent, a will or codicil should be valid and subsisting 
unless mutilated with intent to revoke.19 The case of express re-
vocation presents the problem in a different setting. In such a 
situation, intent may be a decisive factor. If a testator in a sub-
sequent properly-executed instrument says merely, "I revoke my 
will," it may be proper to inquire if he meant will in its technical 
17 Some similar language is to be found in earlier cases but this is the first to give 
it primary emphasis. 
18 33 L.J.P.M. &: A. 27, 12 Weekly L. R. 353 (P. Ct. 1864). 
19 ATKINSON, op. dt. supra note 2, § 84. 
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sense or "will" as his total testamentary scheme. With such facts, 
there would be a valid revocatory instrument; the only inquiry 
is what is revoked.· Intent either to execute or revoke, as the 
case may be, becomes significant only if the required technical 
steps have been taken. Although it is apparent that in some 
cases the testator's subjective intent may be thwarted because 
of failure to comply with the statutory requirements, it is gen-
erally conceded that the underlying policy of the wills statutes, to 
prevent frauds, and the basic means chosen by the legislature to 
achieve this end, requirement of certain objective acts, should 
be preserved. 20 
The first case to give any serious consideration to the implica-
tion of the Statute of Wills21 was Black v. ]obling,22 decided in 
1869, thirty-two years after the statute was adopted. Here a tes-
tator executed a will and two codicils. The will and first codicil 
could not be found after testator's death, giving rise to the pre-
sumption of their destruction animus revocandi. Lord Penzance, 
for the court, after reviewing some of the prior decisions, gave 
consideration to the requirements of the wills act regarding revoca-
tion23 and determined that since the codicil had not been revoked 
in any mode indicated by the statute the codicil should be ad-
mitted. The following year, in a somewhat more emphatic restate-
ment of his opinion in Black v. Jobling,24 Lord Penzance in Goods 
of Savage25 declared that the words of the statute were imperative 
and that a court could not, in the face of the statutory language, 
hold that a codicil had been revoked by the mere revocation of the 
will. 
Following the doctrine laid down in the two immediately pre-
ceding cases, the court in Goods of Turner,26 with Lord Penzance 
again writing the opinion, went to the matter of construction and 
held that difficulty in interpretation of language of the codicil be-
20 Ibid. 
21 7 Will. 4 &: 1 Viet., c. 26. 
22 L. R. 1 P. &: D. 685 (1869). 
23 "That no will or codicil or any part thereof shall be revoked otherwise than • • • 
by another will or codicil executed in manner hereinbefore required, or by some writing 
declaring an intention to revoke the same, and executed in the manner in which a will 
is hereinbefore required to be executed, or by the burning, tearing, or otherwise destroy-
ing the same by the testator or by some person in his presence and by his direction, with 
the intention of revoking the same." 
24 L. R. 1 P. &: D. 685 (1869). 
25 L. R. 2 P. &: D. 78 (1870). 
26 L. R. 2 P. &: D. 403 (1872). 
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cause of references to the will is not cause to prevent probate of 
the codicil. Questions of construction were declared to be for 
another court. It would appear, therefore, that the old theory 
turning on the independence of the instrument had been rejected. 
In Goods of Bleckley,21 the only case to arise in which the 
codicil was not a separate physical instrument, the court held the 
revocation of the will to be a revocation of the codicil. This case, 
decided after Goods of Turner,28 arose when the testator after 
executing a will added a properly-executed codicil at the foot 
of the will and subsequently cut his signature from the will with-
out mutilating the codicil in any way. Parol evidence was ad• 
mitted to show the testator's intent to revoke the codicil. The 
court held it to be a matter of testator's intent whether or not the 
codicil was revoked, and on the evidence found that it was revoked. 
This case, which appears to return to the earlier theory of testator's 
intent, is superficially analogous to the situation presented when a 
clause in a will has been crossed out and it must be determined if 
a partial rather than complete revocation was intended. In such a 
case it is clear that whether the crossing out revokes all or only a 
part of the instrument depends on the intent of the testator.29 
Although this analogy perhaps renders Bleckley understandable, 
the result remains unsatisfactory when it is remembered that the 
codicil itself has in no way been burned, torn, or otherwise muti-
lated. 
Any implication that Goods of Bleckley30 would mark a return 
to consideration of testator's intent as the determinative factor in 
revocation of a codicil was set to rest three years later when the 
same court in Gardiner v. Courthope,31 faced with another codicil, 
followed the line of decisions upholding the integrity of the wills 
statute.82 Although discussion of intent is found in Gardiner, the 
decision is squarely based on the fact that there had been no rev-
ocation in any mode set out in the statute. As to the intent ele-
ment, the court said intent to revoke could not be found from the 
fact that the will had been revoked, even if the codicil depended 
21 8 P.D. 169 (1883). 
28 L. R. 2 P. & D. 403 (1872). 
20 See ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 86. 
so 8 P.D. 169 (1883). 
Sl 12 P.D. 14 (1886). 
S2 Goods of Turner, L.R. 2 P. & D. 403 (1872); Goods of Savage, L.R. 2 P. & D. 78 
(1870); Black v. Jobling, L.R. l P. & D. 685 (1869). 
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on the will for its meaning, and therefore there was no evidence of 
testator's intent to revoke the codicil. 
Thus, the English law evolved from a period when intent was 
the first and only consideration given by the courts in determining 
whether to probate a codicil to a revoked will to the present, rela-
tively well-settled rule that revocation to be effective must meet the 
objective standards of the wills statute. 
III. THE STATUS OF THE AMERICAN LAW 
Forty-nine states33 have a general provision specifying those 
acts to the document which, when done with the proper intent, 
will effectively revoke a testamentary instrument.34 But in only 
eight states is there a statutory provision expressly dealing with 
the effect to be given a codicil after the will has been revoked, and 
in each instance the statute provides that the revocation of the 
will revokes all codicils to that will.35 The wording of the statutes 
in the remaining forty-one jurisdictions begins, generally, in one 
of two ways: "No will or codicil or any part thereof ... "36 or "No 
will .... "37 Following this language is a description of the physical 
acts or kinds of instruments that are necessary to effect a revoca-
tion. The English Statute of Wills, in effect since 1837, was the 
model for several of the American statutes, 38 and its provisions are 
33 Tennessee is the only state in which there is no such provision. 
34 See Rees, American Wills Statutes: II, 46 VA. L. REv. 856, 871-81 (1960). 
35 CAL. PROB. CODE § 79; FLA. STAT. § 731.16 (1959) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 14-318 
(1947); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91-134 (1947); N. D. CENT. CODE § 56-04-15 (1960); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 113 (1951) ; S. D. CoDE § 56.0230 (1939); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 74-1-30 
(1953) • The same provision is found in GUAM PROB. CODE § 79 (1953) • 
36 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-162 (1958) ; KY. REV. STAT. § 394.080 (1960); PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.5 (1950); R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-5-10 (1956); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 64-59 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4045 (1955). 
37 ALA. CODE tit. 61 § 26 (1960); ALASKA COMP. LAws ANN. § 59-3-6 (1949) ; ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-126 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-406 (Supp. 1959); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 152-5-4 (1953) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 109 (1953) ; D. C. CODE ANN. 
§ 19-103 (1951); GA. CoDE § 113-404 (1959); HAWAII REv. LAws § 322-8 (1955); ILL. 
REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 197 (1959); IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-506 (1953) ; IOWA CODE § 633.10 
(1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-611 (1949) ; LA. C1v. ConE ANN. art. 1691 (West 
1952) ; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 169, § 3 (1954) ; Mn. ANN. CoDE art. 93, § 351 (1957) ; 
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 191, § 8 (1955) ; MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 702.9 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 525.19 (1947) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 658 (1956) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.400 (1956) ; NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 30-209 (1956) ; NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.120 (1959) ; N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 551:13 (1955); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-3 (1953); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-8 (1953); 
N. Y. DECED. EsT. LAw § 34; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.1 (Supp. 1959); Omo REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2107.33 (Page 1954); ORE. REV. STAT. § 114.110 (1957); s. C. CODE § 19·221 
(1952); TEX. PROB. CODE § 63 (1956); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 11 (1958); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 11.12.040 (1949); Wis. STAT. § 238.14 (1957) ; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-51 (1957). 
38 See statutes cited note 36 supra. 
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fairly typical. It provides: "That no will or codicil, or any part 
thereof, shall be revoked otherwise than . . . by the burning, tear-
ing or otherwise destroying the same .... "39 The language of this 
section purports to provide the exclusive means by which a will 
or codicil may be revoked. Aside from revocation by another testa-
mentary instrument, an act must be done to the will or codicil in 
order to work a revocation. The words "the same" used in the 
statute clearly relate back to "will or codicil." Thus it seems in-
conceivable that a jurisdiction in which such a statute is in force 
could arrive at any conclusion other than that a codicil to be re-
voked must itself be mutilated in some manner.40 Only by reading 
"will or codicil" to mean "will and codicil41 or codicil," is it 
possible to construe the wills statute not to apply to the case where 
a testator with a valid will and codicil desired to revoke the will 
without affecting the codicil. The statute, so interpreted, would 
merely provide the testator with explicit directions for revoking 
both his will and codicil, or merely his codicil. Such an answer, 
which is not suggested in the opinions, does not seem satisfactory. 
The statute declares those acts which will be sufficient to revoke 
a codicil and no distinction is made between revocation of a codicil 
to a valid will and revocation of a codicil after the will itself has 
been revoked.42 Any attempt to make this distinction would be 
judicial legislation. 
The revocation clause of the Pennsylvania statute43 presents the 
problem in a somewhat different light. It reads: "No will or 
codicil in writing, or any part thereof, can be revoked or altered 
otherwise than: . . . (3) Act to the document. By being burnt, 
torn, canceled, obliterated or destroyed .... " 
The section is, on its face, open to a plausible construction by 
which revocation of a will could operate as a revocation of its 
codicils. This statute also appears to be imperative and exclusive, 
but by speaking in terms of an "act to the document" leaves open 
the possibility that "document" could be construed to mean the 
89 7 Will. 4 &: 1 Viet., c. 26. Omitted from this quotation are provisions regarding 
revocation by subsequent instrument and revocation by operation of law. 
4u The only rational explanation for the result reached in the English cases decided 
immediately after the wills statute was adopted would appear to be that the courts did 
not consider that the situation under discussion was one to which the statute applied. 
41 Thus interpreted "will and codicil" would have the meaning of "will" in its 
non-technical sense of a complete testamentary scheme. 
42 See ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 86. 
43 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 180.5 (1950). 
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will and its codicils as a single testamentary instrument. Thus the 
destruction of the will would be a destruction of "the document" 
within the meaning of the statute and the codicil would be in-
admissible. This rationale has not been expressed by any court 
faced with the codicil to a destroyed will, and the basic theory that 
a will and codicil constitute but a single document is of question-
able validity. Admittedly, a will and its codicils are taken to be 
part of one and the same instrument for purposes of construction 
and testamentary disposition;44 but this is not so for purposes of 
execution45 or probate.46 These results follow from the realization 
that the testator, at the time of execution of the codicil, must 
comply with the formal requirements of the wills statute and also 
have the requisite testamentary intent. Formal compliance with 
the statute in executing the will by a testator who had the proper 
intent will not save a codicil in which either element is missing. 
Further, it is generally agreed that the revocation of the codicil 
will not work a revocation of the will even if the testator so in-
tended. 47 This is a clear case of the courts adhering strictly to the 
language of the wills statutes. An act done to one instrument, the 
codicil, is not sufficient to revoke another, the will. The same 
principle would seem applicable in the reverse situation where it 
is the will that is revoked by an act to that instrument. 
Apparently only five American jurisdictions,48 in a total of 
only sixteen cases, have been faced with the question under con-
sideration. From 1866-when the first of these cases40 was decided 
-to the present, there has been an amazing consistency in the 
decisions. Despite the statutory considerations outlined above, the 
test laid down in all but one50 of the cases is that of the independ-
ence of the propounded codicil: if the codicil makes sense in-
dependently of the will its validity is not affected by the destruc-
44 Gelbke v. Gelbke, 88 Ala. 427, 6 So. 834 (1889); ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 2, 
§ 86. 
45 Malone v. Hobbs, 40 Va. (1 Rob.) 366 (1842) • 
46 In re Hunt's Estate, 122 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1953). 
47 In re Hargroves' Will, 262 App. Div. 202, 28 N.Y.S.2d 571, 262 App. Div. 994, 
30 N.Y.S. 2d 810, aff'd, 288 N.Y. 604, 42 N.E.2d 608 (1942); In re Miller's Will, 119 Misc. 
4, 194 N.Y. Supp. 843 (1922) ; ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 86; Annot. 38 A.L.R. 
244 (1925) • Contra, In re Brookman, 11 Misc. 675, 33 N.Y. Supp. 575 (1895) • 
48 Kentucky, New Jersey, New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania. 
49 Will of Pinckney, 1 Tuck. Sur. 436 (N.Y. 1866). 
50 In re Brown's Will, 6 Misc. 2d 803, 160 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Surr. Ct. 1957); cf. 
Estate of Sapery, 28 N.J. 599, 147 A.2d 777 (1959). 
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tion of the will.51 It is not at all clear, however, what factors a 
court will consider in making its determination as to dependency. 
It appears that the less complicated the codicil, the more likely 
it is to be found independent and hence admitted to probate even 
though the will has been revoked. Thus, where the only effect of 
the codicil was to designate a new executor,52 the will being re-
published in other respects, the codicil was held to be probative. 
Taking the situation one step further, a codicil which not only 
appointed an executor but also made a single bequest to a named 
legatee was admitted.53 Similarly, a bequest of money to a named 
legatee, which was executed on a postal card in conformity with 
the wills statute, was probated, although the will had been re-
voked. 54 
Probate was also granted to an instrument, designated a codicil, 
in which a devise of realty was made to a named devisee with di-
rections that all estate, transfer, and inheritance taxes be paid from 
the remaining estate. The will in this case could not be found 
and the presumption of revocation was raised.55 The reference to 
payment of taxes from the "remaining estate" could have led the 
court to the conclusion that the instrument was dependent and 
therefore not entitled to probate. Seemingly such an interpreta-
tion was properly avoided since the testator would have an "estate" 
from which to pay the taxes regardless of the existence of a valid 
will. The codicil was therefore held not dependent upon the will 
for meaning. 
The most extreme case in which the codicil was probated was 
one in which the codicil disposed of the testator's entire estate.56 
The court held that although the will of the deceased could not be 
found and was presumed to have been revoked, the codicil was 
admissible and in effect was a revocation of the will. 57 
Although the codicil is written on the same sheet of paper, it 
51 Smith's Estate, 2 Pa. County Ct. 626 (1886) • 
52 Estate of Sapery, 28 N.J. 599, 147 A.2d 777 (1959); In re Fould's Will, 21 Misc. 
2d 402, 196 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Surr. Ct. 1960) ; In re Lundequist's Will, 183 Misc. 803, 52 
N.Y.S.2d 234 (Surr. Ct. 1944). 
53 Matter of Emmons, ll0 App. Div. 701, 96 N.Y. Supp. 506 (1906). 
54 Matter of Steiner, 142 Misc. 710, 255 N.Y. Supp. 397 (1932). 
55 O'Neill's Estate, 58 Pa. D. &: C. 351 (Orphans' Ct. 1946). 
50 Smith's Estate, 2 Pa. County Ct. 626 (1886); cf. Newcomb v. Webster, ll3 N.Y. 
191, 21 N.E. 77 (1889). 
51 See I JARMAN, WILLS 25 (8th ed. 1951). This instrument was still a codicil since 
it was intended to be an alteration of the prior testamentary document. 
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is not necessarily revoked by a revocation of the will, if it can be 
carried out apart from the provisions of the will. Such a situation 
was presented in Youse v. Forman,58 where the court held the 
codicil to be dependent and therefore revoked when it made ref-
erence to the testator's executor, a designation made in the revoked 
will.59 Where the paper on which the codicil was written was taped 
to the foot of the will, the court held the codicil to have been 
revoked when the signature on the will was cut out leaving a hole 
in the page, although the codicil itself was not mutilated.00 Surro-
gate Fowler's opinion in this case, In re Francis' Will,61 makes it 
clear, however, that even here revocation of the prior instrument 
does not necessarily work revocation of the codicil if it is an in-
dependent instrument. The fact that the testator could have muti-
lated the codicil but did not do so indicated an intent to distin-
guish the codicil from the will. Despite this statement, the court 
refused to grant probate to the codicil, which specifically named 
a new executor and reappointed a legacy provided in the will. 
The court decided that these provisions were not independent of 
the will.62 
One New York case63 contains language which would seem to 
indicate that a codicil could never be admitted to probate as a 
self-sufficient testamentary instrument.64 This position is reached 
by adopting the theory that a codicil, by definition, is a dependent 
addition to or qualification of a will, 65 and that when an instru-
ment is published as a codicil the testator declares his intention 
that it be merely incident to the will. At another point in the 
opinion, however, the court indicates that an instrument which 
can sensibly be executed apart from any others is actually a "will," 
and that despite its label as a codicil it can be given effect. This 
·case, decided in the same year as In re Francis' Will,66 was discussed 
by Surrogate Fowler, who rejected the "definitional" approach 
58 68 Ky. (5 Bush.) 337 (1869). 
59 The court seemed to take the position that, had the codicil been independent, 
then additional evidence of the testator's intent not to revoke it would have been 
necessary to cany the proponent's burden of proof. 
<lO In re Francis' Will, 73 Misc. 148, 132 N.Y. Supp. 695 (1911). 
61 Ibid. 
62 Cf. In re Ayres' Will, 43 N.E.2d 918 (Ohio App. 1940) . 
63 In re Nokes' Estate, 71 Misc. 382, 130 N.Y. Supp. 187 (1911). 
64 Similar language may be found in Will of Pinckney, I Tuck. Sur. 436 (N.Y. 1866). 
65 Cf. In re Whittier's Estate, 26 Wash. 2d 833, 176 P .2d 281 (1947). 
66 73 Misc. 148, 132 N.Y. Supp. 695 (Sun. Ct. 1911). 
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suggested.67 It does not seem, however, that it would make any 
substantive difference which approach was adopted. On the one 
hand, the court labels all independent testamentary instruments 
"wills," and admits all "wills" to probate, while on the other, the 
traditional definition of "codicil" is accepted but only independent 
codicils are admitted. 
It seems clear that a codicil which attempted to dispose of the 
residue of an estate, after specific bequests contained in a will were 
satisfied, would not be probative under American rules if the will 
itself was not found after the testator's death and was presumed to 
have been revoked. 68 In such a case the interdependence of will 
and codicil is evident since the determination of the content of 
the residue is dependent on the will. Accordingly, a codicil which 
provided for an annuity from the income of a trust established by 
the will was not probated after the will was revoked.69 The only 
donative provision of this codicil was totally dependent upon the 
effectiveness of the will, for without the will there could be no 
trust income with which to pay the annuity. 
In re Brown's Will10 is the only American case giving any in-
dication of an awareness that the wills statutes might be determina-
tive of the question. Here a codicil was admitted to probate al-
though its only function was to revoke one provision of a prior 
"will" which had not been executed in conformity with the wills 
statute and was, therefore, not probative. Surrogate Bennett, rec-
ognizing that the codicil was ineffective to dispose of any part of 
the testator's property, nevertheless admitted it because it was 
executed by a competent testator in accordance with the require-
ments of the statute and had not been marked or mutilated in any 
manner or revoked by a subsequent instrument.71 
IV. CONCLUSION 
If the proposition is accepted that, at least for execution and 
probate, a will and its codicils are separate instruments, and if the 
wills statutes set out the exclusive means by which testamentary 
instruments may be revoked, then clearly the courts should not 
67 See Proctor v. Clarke, 3 Redf. Sur. 445 (N.Y. 1878) where the codicil was denied 
probate on the ground that it had been declared to be a codicil and not a will. 
68 See In re Pardy's Estate, 161 Misc. 77, 291 N.Y. Supp. 969 (1936) (dictum). 
oo In re Bowles' Estate, 96 Ohio App. 265, 114 N.E.2d 229 (1953). 
10 6 Misc. 2d 803, 160 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1957). 
11 Contra, In re Pepper's Estate, 148 Pa. 5, 23 Atl. 1039 (1892) • 
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ignore the statutes when considering whether the revocation of a 
will revokes its codicils. The mere fact that the provision of the 
wills act regarding revocation speaks in terms of how "wills"72 
should be revoked cannot be offered as a valid theory, as the term 
"will" in the statutes is declared to include codicil.73 Where the 
statute speaks in terms of how "wills or codicils"74 are to be re-
voked, the command would seem to be patent. 
The nature and purpose of probate proceedings should also be 
kept in mind when evaluating the position of the American courts 
on the effect of the revocation of a will on its codicils. First, pro-
bate precedes construction.75 The traditional role of the probate 
court is to determine if the instrument before it was properly 
executed or if it has been revoked with the requisite formalities. 
Any interpretative matters are for a later hearing before a court of 
equity. It is not the role of the probate court to construe the 
offered instrument for the purpose of defeating probate. Con-
struction incident to proof of facts which must be established be-
fore the instruments are admissible is permitted,76 but when decid-
ing the question of admissibility the court has no authority to 
inquire into the effectiveness of the instrument to dispose of prop-
erty. 77 So long as it has not been revoked, the instrument must be 
admitted if executed in accordance with the wills statute by a 
competent testator not under undue influence.78 
Second, probate courts, in general, are not equipped for the 
difficult and technical legal task of interpreting and construing 
so complex a document as a will or codicil.79 This is a subject 
which should properly be left to the highly trained trial or ap• 
pellate court judge.80 What is needed at the probate stage is a 
convenient rule to govern the probate judge's decision. The wills 
statutes attempt to provide for this by prescribing those acts which 
72 See statutes cited note 37 supra. 
73 E.g., N. Y. DECED. Es-r. LAw § 2. 
74 See statutes cited note 36 supra. 
75 Matter of Davis, 105 App. Div. 221, 182 N.Y. 468 (1905) • 
76 Syfer v. Dolby, 182 Md. 139, 32 A.2d 529 (1943) • 
77 Matter of Davis, 105 App. Div. 221, 182 N.Y. 468 (1905). 
78 In re Tankelowitz's Will, 162 Misc. 474, 294 N.Y. Supp. 754 (1937). 
79 MODEL PROBATE CODE 467-71 (Simes 1946). 
so Id. at 468. The Model Code points out, however, that since there is a growing 
tendency to place the administrative and interpretative functions in the same court 
which must probate the instrument, the ideal solution would be to raise the qualifications 
of the probate judge. This does not mean that there is no longer a distinction between 
the question of probate, and the question of construction. 
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he must find before an instrument can be admitted or be held to 
have been revoked. 
If the probate court were to adopt the rule that a codicil to a 
revoked will should be admitted to probate unless it had been 
marked or mutilated or revoked by a subsequent properly-executed 
written instrument, as provided in the statute, we would have the 
needed convenient, operating rule, which though easily applied 
would not by its application cause undue hardship. Adopting 
this rule will leave the parties with the opportunity of litigating 
interpretative questions before a better qualified equity court. If 
that court found the instrument to be incapable of intelligent 
construction the instrument would then be of no operative effect. 
However, if the court could give substantive meaning to the 
words of the instrument it would be effective. 
By adopting a rule that the codicil can have no meaning apart 
from the will and thereby automatically denying it probate, a court 
would indeed be following a convenient operating rule, but its 
effect would be unreasonably harsh. There would be no second 
chance on the interpretative questions. By taking the middle 
ground of allowing probate to "independent" instruments the pro-
bate court is taking upon itself a task which rightly belongs to the 
better qualified higher court. What may seem clearly dependent 
to a probate judge might seem quite independent and effective to 
a judge trained in the law.81 
It would seem, therefore, that the more effective operation of 
probate law would result from the establishment of the principle 
that a codicil, properly executed, may be revoked only by a physi-
cal act to the codicil itself or by the execution of a subsequent 
revocatory instrument. 
Roger W. Kapp, S. Ed. 
81 As a simple example, take the case of a codicil in which a bequest of a fixed sum 
is made, in trust, to pay the income to A, remainder to B. The fact that the will in 
which the trustees were named has been revoked could easily lead to a determination 
of dependence by a probate judge whereas this bequest could be given effect by the 
appointment of trustees by an equity court. 
